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Dr. Strange-rating or: How I Learned
that the Motion Picture Association of
America's Film Rating System
Constitutes False Advertising
ABSTRACT

The Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), a trade
association whose members include film production studios,
distributors,and theater chains, administers the most popular system
for rating the content contained in the vast majority of publicly
exhibited motion pictures in the United States. The stated goal of the
rating scheme is to caution parents about any objectionable content
that a film contains in order to allow them to make informed decisions
about which films they will allow their children to see. While the
ratingscheme has undergone several changes since its establishment to
further its stated goal, a fundamental conflict of interest exists because
the MPAA has the dual responsibilities of rating films that are often
produced by its own members and simultaneously advancing those
members' commercial interests within the film industry. Despite the
criticisms that the MPAA's ratingsystem has received, legislaturesand
courts have largely refrained from taking action to correct its problems
due to the United States' historical ambivalence toward governmentimposed censorship.
This Note examines the United States' state and federal
governments' past and current attitudes toward censorship of motion
pictures. Then, it analyzes the MPAA rating scheme's flawed attempt
at creatingan independent means of protectingchildren from potential
Finally, this Note
infliction of psychological harm from films.
demonstrates that the rating scheme constitutes false advertising and
advocates that the Federal Trade Commission, under its congressional
mandate to prevent such advertisingpractices,should order the MPAA
to prepare and make available to the public an objective evaluation of
each newly rated film's objectionable content in a manner that is both
more detailed and more cognizant of the context in which the
objectionable content appears.
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In July 1978, Universal Studios released the now-famous
college film Animal House' to rave reviews. 2 As a result of the

1.
National Lampoon's Animal House (Universal Studios 1978) [hereinafter Animal
House].
2.
Roger Ebert, National Lampoon's Animal House, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Jan. 1, 1978,
available at http://rogerebert.suntimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/19780101REVIEWS
/801010308/1023;
Frank Rich, School Days, TIME, Aug. 14, 1978, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/O,9171,946996,00.html;
Year's Best, TIME, Jan. 1,
1979, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/O,9171,916590,00.html. Rotten
Tomatoes, a website that issues analyses of critical reception to films indicates that 89% of
reviewers recommended Animal House to readers. Rotten Tomatoes, National Lampoons's

20091

DR. STRANGE-RATING

enormous and enduring popularity of the film, which portrays the
antics of the members of a raucous college fraternity house, 3 it has
grossed more than $141 million to date. 4 Before its release, Animal
House received a Restricted rating, abbreviated as R, from the Motion
Picture Association of America (MPAA), 5 a trade association
comprised largely of film production studios and distributors. 6 Movie
theaters that abide by the MPAA's rating scheme, often members of
the motion picture theater trade group that jointly sponsors the
scheme, the National Association of Theatre Owners (NATO), will
refuse to admit children under the age of seventeen to showings of Rrated films like Animal House without the accompaniment of a parent
or legal guardian due to such films' "adult material."7 However, given
Animal House's focus on a relatively youthful cast of characters and
the positive press that it received, scores of children under eighteen
went to see the movie in theaters, including Scott and Richard
8
Hamilton and the four children of William and Linda Cheeseman.
In January 1979, the parents and step-parents of these six
children, whose ages ranged from six to fifteen, purchased tickets for
them to attend screenings of the film, but sent them into the theater
unaccompanied. 9 When the NATO-member movie theater refused to
admit the children to the exhibition, they sued the owner of the
theater under the age discrimination provisions of the Michigan Civil
Rights Act. 10 The Michigan Court of Appeals held that while the
MPAA ratings carry no legal force, theaters may still deny minor

Animal House, http://www.rottentomatoes.com/m/nationallampoons-animaLhouse/ (last visited
Nov. 2, 2009); Rotten Tomatoes, What is the Tomatometer?, http://www.rottentomatoes.coml
help-desk/faq.php#tomatometer (last visited Nov. 2, 2009).
3.
See Animal House, supra note 1.
4.
Id.
5.
Id.;
Internet
Movie
Database,
Parents
Guide
for
Animal House,
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0077975/parentalguide (last visited Aug. 19, 2009) (noting that
Animal House contains scenes that portray sexuality, nudity, profanity, and drug content).
6.
Motion Picture Association of America, Members Page, http://www.mpaa.org/
AboutUsMembers.asp (last visited Aug. 19, 2009) [hereinafter MPAA Members]. The MPAA also
has members hailing from the television industry, but they are irrelevant to this Note's
discussion. Motion Picture Association of America, About the MPAA, http://www.mpaa.org/
AboutUs.asp (last visited Aug. 19, 2009).
7.
Motion Picture Association of America, Ratings, http://www.mpaa.org/
FlmRatRatings.asp (last visited Aug. 19, 2009); National Association of Theatre Owners, About
the Movie Ratings System, http://www.natoonline.org/ratingsabout.htm (last visited Aug. 19,
2009).
8.
Cheeseman v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 310 N.W.2d 408, 410 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
9.
Id.
10.
Id.
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children admission to the films that they exhibit on the basis of those
ratings-even if the film is not "obscene" and parental consent is
given. 1'
Relying on the United States Supreme Court's past
jurisprudence regarding statutes and regulations that attempt to
control the dissemination of potentially obscene materials to children,
as well as the State of Michigan's own legislative actions in this
area, 12 the Cheeseman court reasoned that the Act was not intended to
prevent theaters from enforcing the MPAA rating recommendations.1
The court further justified its holding on the grounds that movie
theaters are subject to heightened tort liability regarding minor
patrons due to children's "immaturity and inexperience" and that, by
excluding minors from exhibitions of films that contain "adult
material," theaters are insulating themselves from any civil liability
stemming from psychological trauma potentially inflicted on a child
14
who views such films.
The Cheeseman case illustrates the central problems that arise
when society attempts to maximize its citizens' freedom of expression
while simultaneously safeguarding its children from the potential
psychological damage that some of those expressions may cause in
immature minds. For motion pictures in the United States, the best
solution advanced to date is the use of content guidelines set by the
MPAA, a private industry organization independent of government
influence. However, despite the MPAA's attempts to portray its rating
system as an evolving comprehensive solution to the problems facing
parents in making decisions regarding what films they allow their
children to watch, 15 critics have complained about the rating system's
lack of specificity and the varying levels of attention it gives to
different types of objectionable content and also alleged that conflicts
of interest within the MPAA cause it to use its rating system to
16
influence the commercial success of the films it rates.
Part I of this Note outlines the analytical framework created by
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, which provide
freedom of speech through the medium of motion pictures. Until 1952,

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 410, 414-15.
Id. at 412-13.
Id. at 415.
Id. at 411-12.
See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
See discussion infra Part II.B.
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films did not fall under the ambit of constitutional protection. 17 Once
the Supreme Court finally decided to consider films to be
constitutionally protected speech,1 8 they then became subject to the
body of law that addresses, and largely prohibits, "obscene" speech.
Since it established what it felt to be a sufficiently conclusive
definition of obscenity, 19 the Court has largely refrained from refining
it further, choosing instead to allow the states a degree of
independence to create their own legislative designs. 20 However, the
Court has not been totally absent from commenting on the
21
constitutionality of state obscenity statutes.
Part II of the Note analyzes the history of film content ratings
within the United States. Beginning with the history of the MPAA,
the Note discusses its current ratings procedures and the criticisms
and legal attacks it has received. The Note also addresses the legal
definition and prohibition of "false advertising" and its potentially
serious implications for rating systems, as well as the method used by
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to determine whether an
advertisement meets this definition and the remedial measures that it
may prescribe.
Part III applies the FTC's analytical method to the MPAA film
rating system. The current system's usage of five categories to classify
escalating levels of objectionable content within a rated film 22 sets up
an arbitrary framework that lacks specificity. This deficiency in
clarity of the ratings' connotations creates a strong potential to
materially mislead consumers as to the attributes of a rated film; such
23
a potential is the touchstone of false advertising.
In Part IV, the Note surveys the three main approaches taken
by foreign countries to regulate the content of films: state-mandated
submission to a governmental ratings board before exhibition; intra17.
See generally Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (concluding that
cinematic expression was included within the free speech and free press guarantees of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments).
18.
Id.
19.
See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957) (establishing that the standard
for obscenity is "whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest"); see also
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (quoting in part Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230
(1972)).
20.
Miller, 413 U.S. at 25 (emphasizing that it is not the function of the Court to suggest
regulatory schemes for the States).
21.
See Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); Erznoznik v. City
of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975).
22.
Motion Picture Association of America, supra note 7.
23.
See Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 617 (3d Cir. 1976).
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country provincial regulations; and voluntary, privately-funded
systems similar to the MPAA. After analyzing these approaches, the
Note concludes that the FTC should order the MPAA to supplement
its ratings with a publicly available objective evaluation of all
objectionable content contained within each newly rated film that
involves a greater level of detail than the current ratings and takes
into account the cinematic context that surrounds the objectionable
content.

I.

INTRODUCTION: CENSORSHIP LAW AND CONTEMPORARY CINEMA

A. The Constitution and Motion Pictures
The law excluded motion pictures from the sphere of First
Amendment protection for approximately the first seventy years of
their existence. 24 Due to this lack of constitutional protection, many
states required prospective exhibitors of motion pictures to obtain a
license from the government-usually at the municipal level-before
they could show any film to the general public. 25 In cases where such
licensing statutes came under legal attack, the judiciary tended to
defer to the judgment of the entity responsible for the licensing
decision, so long as it exercised its judgment "fairly, honestly, upon
correct information, and with a view to the moral and physical welfare
of the public."26 While these restrictions on constitutionally protected
24.
See Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 243-44 (1915); Thayer
Amusement Corp. v. Moulton, 7 A.2d 682, 686 (R.I. 1939) ("Motion pictures are undoubtedly
within the category of shows and exhibitions, and for more than a century these have been
considered along with rope or wire dancing, wrestling, boxing, and sparring matches and also
roller skating and dancing in rinks and public halls, as subject to regulation and even prohibition
under the police power of the state."). See also Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia, History of
Motion Pictures, http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia-761567568/HistoryofMotion_.
Pictures.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2009) (noting that, depending on how one defines "motion
picture," the technology was invented sometime between the 1870s and the 1890s).
25.
See, e.g., United Artists Corp. v. Thompson, 171 N.E. 742 (Ill. 1930); Edwards v.
Thompson, 262 Ill. App. 520 (Ill. App. Ct. 1931); Illinois ex rel. Guggenheim v. City of Chicago,
209 Ill. App. 582 (Ill. App. Ct. 1918); Bainbridge v. City of Minneapolis, 157 N.W. 964 (Minn.
1915); Message Photo-Play Co. v. Bell, 179 A.D. 13 (N.Y. App. Div. 1917); In re Goldwyn Distrib.
Corp., 108 A.2d 816 (Pa. 1919).
26.
Silverman v. Gilchrist, 260 F. 564, 566 (2d. Cir. 1919); accord Edwards, 262 Ill. App
at 523 ("Considering the picture before us, we have no hesitation in saying that ... there would
be such a difference of opinion as to its character that it must be held . . . that the municipal
officers in refusing a permit did not abuse the discretion lodged in them."); Guggenheim, 209 Ill.
App. at 584 ('The fact that the witnesses entertained different views as to the immoral character
of the picture ...

indicates that there was room for a difference of opinion on the subject ....

If

there is a reasonable basis for the censor's opinion, then a refusal of the permit based thereon
could not be deemed an abuse of power .... "); Bainbridge, 157 N.W. at 965-66 ("[T]he statute
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28
speech-referred to as "prior restraints" 2 7 or "previous restraints" would normally violate the Constitution, 29 they have been permitted
"[i]f there be capacity for evil."30 When the Supreme Court determined
in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson that motion pictures did, in fact,
qualify as protected speech because they serve as meaningful vehicles
for conveying ideas, the very criteria that had justified prior restraints
on exhibiting them suddenly signified the value that they contribute
to society. 31 The result was that films began to enjoy the same First

gives the mayor power to revoke licenses .... It cannot be used capriciously, or arbitrarily or
oppressively, but only in the exercise of an honest and reasonable discretion .... [If] there is
room for honest difference of opinion, and the determination requires judgment and discretion,
the action of the officer will be conclusive upon the courts."); Message Photo-Play, 179 A.D. at 20
("[T]he matter must be left to the official whom the Legislature has delegated authority, and his
action . . . cannot be annulled or controlled collaterally by mandamus or injunction."); In re
Goldwyn, 108 A. at 818 ("[T]he discretion here committed to the board of censors is not to be
narrowed by technical and official rules when the exercise involved is one of judicial discretion..
. . What is required is that it must be ...associated with an honest desire and endeavor on its
part to impartially enforce its provisions.").
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1232 (8th ed. 2004).
27.
See generally Joseph Burstyn, Inc., 343 U.S. at 503 (using the terms "prior restraint"
28.
and "previous restraint" interchangeably within the same paragraph).
See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) ("Any system of prior
29.
restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its
constitutional validity."). See also Joseph Burstyn, Inc., 343 U.S. at 503 ("New York requires that
permission to communicate ideas be obtained in advance from state officials who judge the
content of the words and pictures sought to be communicated .... [S]uch a previous restraint is
a form of infringement upon freedom of expression to be especially condemned.").
Joseph Burstyn, Inc., 343 U.S. at 502 ("It does not follow that the Constitution
30.
requires absolute freedom to exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all times and places.");
see also Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 47 ("Nor has it been suggested that all
previous restraints on speech are invalid.").
Compare Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y.,
31.
360 U.S. 684, 689 (1959) (noting that Constitutional protection of speech "is not confined to the
expression of ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority'), 343 U.S. at 505 (emphasizing
the social value of the freedom of expression of differing opinions regarding religion) (emphasis
added)), and Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960, 961 (1952) ("If a board of censors can tell the
American people what it is in their best interest to see or to read or to hear ... then thought is
regimented, authority substituted for liberty, and the great purpose of the First Amendment to
keep uncontrolled the freedom of expression defeated."(internal citations omitted)), with
App. at 584 (indicating that differing points of view on a subject created
Guggenheim, 209 Ill.
justifiable grounds for deferring to a censor's judgment) and Bainbridge, 157 N.W. at 966 ("It is
useless to spend time arguing the question whether reasonable people might differ as to the
advisability of permitting the [expression] ....The question is one that calls for the exercise of
official discretion, and the courts should not direct or enjoin [the censor's] action."). But see
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965) ("[A] noncriminal process which requires the prior
submission of a film to a censor avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes place under
[O]nly a
procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system ....
procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid restraint.").
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Amendment protection as books, newspapers, and radio broadcasts;
32
however, they also became subject to the limits of that protection.
B. Censorship Law in the United States
The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States mandates that "Congress shall make
33
no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."
However, the Supreme Court has held that this does not protect all
forms of communication. 34 While not wishing to understate the
importance of the Amendment's primary underlying purpose "to
assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people," 35 the Court has
noted that several forms of communication, such as obscenity, do not
warrant constitutional protection because of the scant social value
36
that they possess and the potential societal harm they might cause.
Until 1934, an expression could be deemed obscene and suppressed by
the government if an excerpt of it, when considered without regard to
the context in which it was found, tipped the balance in favor of
censorship. 37 While the Court later overturned that approach and
held that evaluation of the "dominant effect" of a communication is the
proper method of determining whether it constitutes obscenity, the
actual definition remained somewhat ambiguous until the Court
decided Roth v. United States in 1957.38
In Roth, the Court rejected the historical English approach to
labeling speech obscene 39 and instead approved the following test:
"whether to the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole

32.
See infra notes 34-36.
33.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
34.
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
35.
Id.
36.
See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (1942) ("[T]he lewd and obscene, the profane, the
libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words ... are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."(emphasis added)).
37.
See United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses, 72 F.2d 705, 708 (2d. Cir. 1934)
(observing that evaluating whether an expression is obscene based upon selected contents taken
out of context "would exclude [from society] much of the great works of literature and involve an
impracticability that cannot be imputed to Congress.").
38.
Id.; see also Roth, 354 U.S. 476.
39.
Roth, 354 U.S. at 489-90 (criticizing Regina v. Hicklin, [1868] 3 L.R.Q.B. 360)
(U.K.)).
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appeals to prurient interest."40 This definition underwent further
specification in Miller v. California and now requires, in addition to
the Roth test, that the communication contain specific, statutorily
defined sexual content or excretory function that is "patently
offensive" and that the work, as a whole, "lacks serious literary,
41
artistic, political, or scientific value."
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1461, the federal government prohibits the
mailing of obscene materials, among other items. 42 All fifty states
have also enacted statutes or regulations pertaining to obscene
43
materials, especially targeting their dissemination to children.
Oftentimes, the regulations concerning children's access to obscene
materials also apply to the distribution of protected speech that
contains sexual material-such as pornography-since, while not
obscene for adults, it qualifies as obscene for minors. 44 Dicta in
Jacobellis v. Ohio provided the first indication that the Court
approved of a state's ability to restrict minors' access to certain forms
of protected speech even though such restrictions curtail their First
Amendment rights as applied to states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. 45
The Court squarely addressed this issue in Ginsberg v. New
York, a case involving a New York statute prohibiting the sale to
minors of pictures depicting nudity. 46
In holding the statute
constitutionally valid, the Court found that the State did not act
irrationally by restraining children from viewing this potentially
"harmful" material, which it defined using language that echoed, but
47
did not entirely copy, the Court's established definition of obscenity.

40.
Id.
41.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 39 (1973).
42.
18 U.S.C. § 1467 (2009).
43.
National Obscenity Law Center, http://www.moralityinmedia.org/nolc/
index.htm?statutesIndex.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2009).
44.

See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-160 (2009).

45.
The case addressed an Ohio obscenity statute under which the appellant was
convicted for exhibiting a French film that contained a brief, but graphic, adulterous sex scene.
378 U.S. 184, 195-96 (1964). While six of the Justices voted to reverse the conviction, they could
not agree on a legal basis for doing so. Id. at 185-204. Five explicitly agreed that the film was not
obscene and, in the plurality opinion agreed upon by three of them, they "recognized the
legitimate and indeed exigent interest of States and localities throughout the Nation in
preventing the dissemination of material deemed harmful to children. But that interest does not
justify a total suppression of such material, the effect of which would be to 'reduce the adult
population . . .to reading only what is fit for children."' Id. at 195 (quoting in part Butler v.
Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)).
46.
390 U.S. 629 (1968).
47.
Id. at 633, 641-43.
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The essential difference between the definitions is that "harmful"
material is meant to be construed by the "adult community" with
regard to the material's appeal to the prurient interest of, and lack of
social importance to, minors, while "obscenity" is interpreted based
upon general "community standards." 48 Later cases examined the
government's power to impose other types of limits on the
49
dissemination of potentially offensive material.
For the government to regulate constitutionally protected
speech, the legislation must (1) serve a compelling government
interest and (2) be narrowly drawn to serve that interest without
unduly interfering with First Amendment rights by using the least
restrictive means possible to do so. 50 Protecting the physical and
mental well-being of children has consistently been held to satisfy the
compelling interest element, 51 as have comparable efforts at
preventing neighborhood blight, 52 maintaining the public peace, and
53
preventing violence.
In order to be sufficiently narrowly drawn, the statute should
specifically enunciate the content that it seeks to regulate as well as
the context that would make it indecent. 54 The requirement of using
the least restrictive method of regulation possible may be satisfied by
allowing for an expeditious process for classifying the regulated
material with the added ability to appeal to the courts. 55 This element
likely poses the greatest challenge to drafters of legislation,5 6
especially with regard to mainstream motion pictures, because the
level of a popular film's offensiveness is a necessarily subjective
48.
Id. at 636 ("Material which is protected for distribution to adults is not necessarily
constitutionally protected from restriction upon its dissemination to children .... [T]he concept
of obscenity ... may vary according to the group whom the questionable material is directed or
from whom it is quarantined.") (quoting Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 218 N.E.2d 668); see also
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at 489.
49.
See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (finding an ordinance
prohibiting the exhibition of films containing nudity at drive-in theaters on screens which are
visible from public places unconstitutional for lack of legislative specificity). See also Young v.
American Mini-Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting operation
of "adult theaters" within 1,000 feet of two other adult establishments, or within 500 feet of a
residential area).
50.
Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
51.
See id. at 119; Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 213; Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-19
(1973); Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636; Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 313 U.S. App. D.C. 94
(D.C. Cir. 1995); Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 689 (8th Cir. 1992).
52.
See Young, 427 U.S. at 75.
53.
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-73 (1942).
54.
See Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 217-18; Video Software DealersAssn, 968 F.2d at 689.
55.
See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 61 (1965).
56.
See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 525-26 (1948).
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determination. 57 While defining and regulating "pornography" has
been sufficiently easy for governments due to the relative ease of
enumerating the qualifying content, impeding minors' access to other
types of films that, while not obscene, might still be judged by parents
as inappropriate for their children, has proven itself to be a thornier
issue. Enter the MPAA.
II. BACKGROUND: AMERICAN FILM RATINGS AND FALSE ADVERTISING

A. The Motion PictureAssociation of America Rating System
In response to public objection to the perceived depravity of
mainstream films and the growing efforts of city and state
governments to censor films, the Motion Pictures Producers and
Distributors Association (MPPDA) was established in 1922 to advance
the interests of the motion picture industry. 58 This nonprofit trade
association, whose members include motion picture production studios
and distributors, 59 became the MPAA in 1945.60

The MPAA took its first step in assuming the responsibility of
controlling the content of publicly exhibited films in 1930 with the
adoption of the Motion Picture Production Code, a list of subject
matter and content prohibited from depiction in cinema. 61 An
amendment to the Code in 1934 created the Production Code
Administration which enforced the requirement that all films
designed for public exhibition in MPAA-member theaters abide by the
Code's guidelines and earn the MPAA's seal of approval prior to
exhibition. 62
Filmmakers who wished to eschew the MPAA's
57.
See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 689 (8th Cir. 1992).
58.
Encyclopzdia Britannica Online, Motion Picture Association of America,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/394174/Motion-Picture-Association-of-America
(last
visited Nov. 3, 2009).
59.
MPPA Members, supra note 6 (disclosing that members of the MPAA include
Paramount Pictures Corporation, Sony Pictures Entertainment Inc., Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corporation, Universal City Studios LLLP, Walt Disney Studios Motion Pictures, and
Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc.).
60.
See Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia, Hays Office, http://encarta.msn.com/
encyclopedia_762505864/HaysOffice.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2009). For the sake of clarity and
ease of reading, the subsequent discussion will only use the term 'WPAA," even though
"MPPDA" is the technically accurate term for the organization when referring to events
occurring prior to 1945.
61.
Id.
62.
David P. Hayes, The Production Code of the Motion Picture Industry (1930-1967),
http://productioncode.dhwritings.com/multipleframes-productioncode.php
(last visited Nov. 3,
2009).
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evaluation and release their films without an MPAA seal faced
potential boycott from the influential National Legion of Decency 63
and may have had to obtain approval from government censorship
boards; 64 the latter consequence existed only until the Supreme Court
outlawed government censorship of motion pictures in 1952.65
However, such a boycott would almost certainly spell commercial
failure for the film. Spurred by the desire for commercial success and
a preference for self-regulation over government censorship, film
producers' near-universal adherence to the Code resulted in the
issuance of the seal to the vast majority of films released between

1934 and

1968.66

During the American cultural revolution of the 1960s, the
MPAA, the NATO, and the International Film Importers and
Distributors of America designed and implemented the forerunner to
the current rating system in order to "fulfilln the movie industry's self
prescribed obligation to the parents of America" to protect children
from objectionable cinematic content. 67 Then, as now, the submission
of a film to the ratings board was completely voluntary, although it
was not free. 68 However, as parents grew to trust and rely upon the
MPAA's discretion in rating films, mainstream theaters began
showing only MPAA-rated films that received a rating less severe
than X.69 The rating scheme has since undergone several revisions
and upgrades in its transformation to the system of G, PG, PG-13, R,
NC-i 7 that exists today, including the creation of the PG-13 rating,
the replacement of the X rating with NC-i 7 (due to the near total
appropriation of the X rating by the adult film industry to

63.
The two million members of the National Legion of Decency, a Catholic organization
that also incorporated Protestants and Jews, pledged to "remain away from all motion pictures
except for those which do not offend decency and Christian morality." Religion: Legion of
Decency, TIME, June 11, 1934, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/
0,9171,762190-1,00.html. The pledge was "recited in unison at Sunday Masses, Knights of
Columbus meetings, and parochial school assemblies." Thomas Doherty, Church's Reach
Diminished - At Least When it Comes to Films, BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY, May 22, 2006, available
at http://my.brandeis.edu/news/item?newsitemid=105052&show-releasedate= l.
64.
See supra note 25.
65.
See Joseph Burstyn, Inc., 343 U.S. 495.
66.
Doherty, supra note 63.
67.
Motion Picture Association of America, Ratings History, http://www.mpaa.org!
Ratings-historyl.asp (last visited Aug. 19, 2009).
68.
Id.
69.
Id. ("[A]nyone who did not submit his or her film for rating could self-apply the X
[rating] .... NATO urged the creation of an adult-only category .... Hence, the four-category
system, including the X rating was installed .... The X rating over the years appeared to [take]
on a surly meaning in the minds of most people ... ").
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pornographic films), and the addition of brief justifications for the
70
particular rating given.
Ratings are issued by the Classification and Rating
Administration (CARA), which is organized as a division of the MPAA
and is composed of ten to thirteen raters who serve seven-year
terms. 71 The only qualifications of these raters are that they "have a
shared parenthood experience, [are] possessed of an intelligent
maturity, and... have the capacity to put themselves in the role of
most American parents" while viewing and rating a film. 7 2 The MPAA
Chairperson, with the concurrence of the President of the NATO,
appoints one member of the CARA as Chairperson of the CARA
Ratings Board who then chooses the other raters. 73 Once every rater
has viewed a film, assigned it a rating, and justified that rating to the
others, they take a majority vote. 74 Factors the board considers
75
include "sex, violence, nudity, language, adult topics and drug use."
If the producer(s) and/or distributor(s) of a film are displeased
with the rating it receives, they may either re-submit it after further
editing or appeal the rating decision to the Classification and Rating
Appeals Board (Appeals Board). 76 The Appeals Board can vary in size
from nine to seventeen people and consists of a large number of
motion picture industry insiders, including the Chief Executive Officer
(CEO) of the MPAA, the President of the NATO, and three
representatives chosen by the member companies of the MPAA. The
Appeals Board may also include up to four individuals unaffiliated
with the motion picture industry who meet the requirements to serve
as raters for the CARA and are chosen by the CEO of the MPAA and
the President of the NATO. 77 Any member of the Appeals Board that
has any economic interest in the specific film under scrutiny must

70.
Motion Picture Association of America, supra note 7 (listing the content, ratings, and
criteria that warrant each rating); Motion Picture Association of America, Ratings Revisions,
http://www.mpaa.org/Ratings-hstryRvsns.asp (last visited Aug. 19, 2009).
are
Rated,
How
Movies
of America,
Picture
Association
71.
Motion
http://www.mpaa.org/RatingsHowRated.asp (last visited Aug. 19, 2009).
Id.
72.
73.
Id.; National Association of Theatre Owners, Classification and Rating Rules,
http://www.natoonline.org/CARA%20Rules%20-ShoWest%202007%20official%20version-.pdf
(last visited Aug. 19, 2009).
74.
Motion Picture Association of America, supra note 71; National Association of
Theatre Owners, supranote 73.
75.
National Association of Theatre Owners, supra note 73.
76.
Id.
77.
Id.
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recuse him or herself from the appeals proceedings.7 8 Calling the
legitimacy of the Appeals Board's impartiality into question, more
than three-quarters of the potential seventeen members have
unquestionable commercial ties to the motion picture industry and
thus, even in the scenario that maximizes the power of the impartial
voice, the four representatives unaffiliated with the industry will
always constitute less than half of the Appeals Board.
After the Appeals Board views a film, it hears oral arguments
from the film's producer or distributor in favor of a less restrictive
rating and from the Chairperson of the Ratings Board in favor of the
issued rating.7 9 The Appeals Board will overturn a rating only if, after
private deliberations, two-thirds of the members believe the rating
issued by the Ratings Board "is inconsistent with the standards for
that rating;" there exists no opportunity for further appeals, aside
from resorting to judicial arbitration.8 0 As a preemptory rebuttal to
potential allegations of a conflict of interest in the ratings process, the
MPAA asserts, without any support, that "[n]o one in the movie
industry has the authority or power to push the [CARA Ratings]

Board in any direction or otherwise influence

it."81

Of course, this

ignores the fact that the Chairperson of the MPAA chooses the
Chairperson of the CARA Ratings Board who then chooses the
82
remaining raters.
B. Criticismsof the MPAA Ratings
1. Organizational and Individual Commentary
Notwithstanding the MPAA's claims of independence, it is not
surprising that in undertaking the responsibility of rating films
produced by members and non-members alike, the MPAA has drawn
considerable criticism. According to a study conducted by the Harvard
School of Public Health in 2004 comparing the content of films
released in 2003 with similarly rated films from 1992, ratings had
"creeped" over time, meaning that the MPAA has progressively
allowed films to contain significantly more sexual content, violence,

Id.
78.
Motion Picture Association of America, supra note 71; National Association of
79.
Theatre Owners, supra note 73.
Id.
80.
Motion Picture Association of America, supra note 71.
81.
Motion Picture Association of America, supra note 71; National Association of
82.
Theatre Owners, supranote 73.
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and profanity.8 3 Especially alarming was the higher amount of
violence contained in G-rated films, which are usually intended to
84
appeal to young children.
The perceived arbitrariness of the rating system has also
attracted much attention. Famed film critic Roger Ebert has been an
especially outspoken critic of the ratings process, particularly with
regard to what he sees as an undue sensitivity to sexual content and
complacency with violence.8 5 Since films are submitted to the MPAA
voluntarily, there exists precious little ground for their creators to
take legal action against the MPAA for allegedly improper ratings.
However, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of
New York have tried cases considering the flaws in the MPAA
ratings.8 6 In both cases, the MPAA and its ratings prevailed, but the
courts intonated that the outcome of future cases with stronger facts
87
might differ.
2. Judicial Commentary
In 1988, Maljack Productions, an independent movie
production studio, submitted Henry: Portraitof a Serial Killer to the
CARA for a rating.88 Maljack was not a member of the MPAA.8 9
Based largely upon four particularly offensive sequences, the film
received an X rating.90 Instead of editing the film, Maljack appealed

83.
Kimberly M. Thompson & Fumie Yokota, Violence, Sex, and Profanity in Films:
Correlationof Movie Ratings With Content, MEDSCAPE GENERAL MEDICINE, Vol. 6, No. 3, July 12,
2004, available at http://www.kidsrisk.harvard.edu/images/MGMmovies.pdf.
84.
Id.
85.
See Roger Ebert, The Passion of the Christ, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Feb. 24, 2004,
available at http://rogerebert.suntimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20040224REVIEWS/
402240301/1023. In his review of the film The Passionof the Christ, which depicts the crucifixion
of Jesus Christ in explicit detail, Ebert calls it "the most violent film [he has] ever seen" and cites
the film's R rating as proof that the MPAA either refuses to issue the NC-17 rating for a film
based solely upon violent content, or is susceptible to intimidation by films' subject matter
because "[i]f it had been anyone other than Jesus up on that cross, [he feels] that NC-17 would
have been automatic." Id.
86.
Maljack Prods. v. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., 52 F.3d 373 (D.C. Cir. 1995);
Miramax Films Corp. v. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., 560 N.Y.S.2d 730 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990).
87.
Id.
88.
Maljack, 52 F.3d at 374.
89.
Id. at 375.
90.
Id. at 374-75. While the opinion did not specifically enunciate the content of these
sequences, the film itself was loosely based on the real-life serial killer Henry Lee Lucas who
claimed to have killed one hundred or more people and was ultimately convicted of eleven
homicides. See Katherine Ramsland, Henry Lee Lucas, TRuTV CRIME LIBRARY, available at
http://www.trutv.com/library/crime/serial-killers/notorious/henry-lee-lucasl1.html.
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the rating, and the Appeals Board affirmed. 91 Ultimately, Maljack
decided to release the film without a rating and later filed a breach of
contract suit against the MPAA for violation of an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. 92 Maijack alleged that, because many
theaters refuse to exhibit X-rated or unrated films, the film earned
less money than it would have if it had been released with an R
93
rating, which Maljack claimed that it deserved.
The district court dismissed the claim as "devoid of nonconclusory factual allegations capable of supporting an inference that
the [MPAA] had acted unfairly or in bad faith" and denied Maljack's
motion to amend its complaint. 94 The thrust of Maljack's argument on
appeal was that the MPAA and its ratings process are biased against
independent non-member studios. 95 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
found that an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing did exist,
and that, if Maljack could prove that the MPAA had acted as alleged,
a breach of that covenant had occurred. 96 From a procedural
standpoint, because the applicable standard merely required the facts
to support the allegation of deliberate and conscious bad faith, the
court reversed, but it made no comment on the validity of Maljack's
claim or the likelihood of its success upon remand. 97 However, it did
note that if Maljack could adduce evidence of some bias in the ratings
criteria, a pattern of the CARA assigning unwarranted X ratings to
independent films, or an interest of the MPAA's members in causing
Henry to be less profitable, its claim would carry more weight than the
bare assertions of discrimination that it had offered. 98 While the
Maijack case does not refute the MPAA's assertion that "there has
never been even the slightest jot of evidence that the rating system
has deliberately fudged a decision or bowed to pressure," 99 the basic
conflict of interest that Maljack claimed caused Henry to be rated X
does not seem fantastic given the structure of the MPAA. After all,
the absence of evidence of discrimination is not necessarily evidence of
an absence of discrimination.

91.
Maljack, 52 F.3d at 375.
92.
Id.
93.
Id.
94.
Id.
95.
Id.
96.
Id. at 376.
97.
Id. at 376-77.
98.
Id. at 376.
99.
Motion Picture Association of America, supra note 71; National Association of
Theatre Owners, supra note 73.
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The MPAA received a thorough lambasting from the judicial
system in Miramax Films Corp. v. Motion Picture Association of
America, a case specifically highlighting several of the major problems
with the MPAA rating system. Like Maljack, Miramax sought a
judicially-mandated modification of the rating for its film Tie Me Up!
Tie Me Down! from X to R. 100 The court noted that "[t]he negative
economic impact of not obtaining a satisfactory rating is clear and
severe." 10 1 Miramax claimed, as did Maljack, that the Appeals Board
is unduly influenced by the motion picture industry but, like Maljack,
could not put forth any evidence of such influence.10 2
While the court ultimately denied Miramax's claims, it did so
only after pointing out the many flaws in the MPAA rating system.103
Its criticisms included: the MPAA's ability to affect a film's
profitability as a result of its evaluation based on standards that,
while reflective of the average parent, are ultimately subjective and by
no means universally appealing; the sparse qualifications required to
be a part of the CARA; the disproportionate focus of the CARA on
sexual content as opposed to violence and drug use; a lack of input
from experts in the area of child psychology; and the ability of
producers and directors to negotiate for a film's rating, which, in the
court's opinion, makes it little more than a marketing tool to promote
a given film to a target audience.1 0 4 While one could certainly
question the appropriateness of the court's decision to include so much
editorial dicta in its opinion, the utility of the court's comments to
guide the creation of a better system of educating parents about the
content of the films they allow their children to see should not go
unheeded.
C. False Advertising
1. Statutory Definitions
Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 45, the FTC is charged with preventing
unfair or deceptive methods of corporate competition that are likely to
cause substantial injury to consumers and that consumers cannot

100.
Miramax Films Corp. v. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., 560 N.Y.S.2d 730, 731 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1990). Maijack filed a similar claim at the trial level, but it was dismissed on
jurisdictional grounds and not appealed. Maijack, 52 F.3d at 375.
101.
Miramax, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 732.
Id. at 733.
102.
103.
Id. at 732-36.
104.
Id.
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reasonably avoid.10 5 The definition of "corporations" includes an
association "which is organized to carry on business for its own profit
or that of its members." 106 One prohibited method of competition that
the FTC's Bureau of Consumer Protection regulates is the
dissemination of false advertisements, 10 7 defined as "advertisement[s],
other than labeling, which [are] misleading in a material respect" and
are likely to induce a consumer to purchase a service. 10
An
advertisement is misleading in a material respect if a reasonable
person would attach importance to the advertisement's message but
would likely be misled by that message. 109 An advertisement may be
misleading as a result of representations, omissions, or behavior on
behalf of the seller, 110 including the act of providing a document that
indicates that the product or service meets an objective performance
standard.1 1 '
Additionally, the issue is neither whether an
advertisement actually does, in fact, mislead consumers nor whether
the advertiser actually intended to deceive anyone; rather, the
applicable standard is the likelihood or propensity to deceive.1 12 The
injury that the FTC seeks to prevent occurs when consumers obtain
products or services that differ from what they sought as a result of a
misleading advertisement issued by an FTC-regulated corporation,
regardless of the objective wisdom of the consumer's pursuit of the
sought-after product." 3
2. The FTC's Method of Evaluation
The FTC analyzes advertisements as a whole to determine
whether they are deceptive. 1 4 While an advertisement is not
105.
15 U.S.C. § 45(a), (n) (2009).
106.
Id. § 44.
107.
FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection - Division of Advertising Practices,
http://www.ftc.govlbcplbcpap.shtm (last visited Aug. 19, 2009).
108.
15 U.S.C. § 55(a) (2009).
109.
Id. § 55(a)(1); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(2) (1977).
110.
15 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1) (2009). The justification for finding the potential for deception in
omissions is that consumers should be protected from having to scrutinize closely and critically
think about each and every advertisement they encounter. See Donaldson v. Read Magazine,
Inc., 333 U.S. 178, 188-89 (1948). A seller's actions have been found to create representations of
the nature of a product or service because they have the capacity to induce consumers into
making incorrect assumptions. See In re Peacock Buick, Inc., 86 F.T.C. 1532 (1975).
111.
See Chrysler Corp., 99 F.T.C. 347 (1982).
112.
See Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 617 (3d Cir. 1976).
113.
FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 78 (1934).
114.
See 15 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1) (2009) ("[1]n determining whether any advertisement is
misleading, there shall be taken into account (among other things) ... representations made...
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considered "false" if it conveys a message that could be misinterpreted
if its representations are grossly contorted, it will not be found
truthful if, among the message's many reasonable interpretations,
only one is true. 115 When determining whether an advertisement has
the propensity to mislead, the FTC views it from the perspective of an
average person in the class of people targeted by the advertiser. 116 For
example, if an advertisement for a toy is directed towards children, it
is misleading if it would deceive the average child with regard to the
toy's attributes.1 1 7 In situations where an advertisement's target
audience lacks the maturity, sophistication, or mental capacity to fully
criticize the representations, actions, and potential omissions that the
advertisement makes, "deception is most serious"'18 and "such claims
may be so likely to be misleading as to warrant restriction."' 19
Since propensity for deception is the operable criterion, the
FTC is not required to find intent with regard to misrepresentations
made by the seller or to produce evidence of any actual deception
120
among consumers unless the alleged deception is not apparent.
This is not to say that a complete absence of evidence will suffice, but
rather that courts will give generous deference to the FTC's findings
so long as they are based upon substantial evidence.1 21 As such,
courts have likened the finding of an advertisement's potential for
122
deception to a finding of fact rather than a conclusion of law.
by statement, word, design, device, sound, or any combination thereof." (emphasis added)); Am.
Home Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 688 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting that the FTC scrutinized the
message contained in the "aural-visual" pattern of a deceptive television commercial).
115.
See Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294, 303 (7th Cir. 1979).
116.
See Heinz W. Kirchner Trading As Universe Co., 63 F.T.C. 1282 (1963) ("If . . .
advertising is aimed at a specially susceptible group of people (e.g., children), its truthfulness
must be measured by the impact it will make on them, not others to whom it is not primarily
directed."). See also Avalon Indus. Inc., 83 F.T.C. 1728 (1974); Ideal Toy Corp., 64 F.T.C. 297
(1964).
117.
The FTC tends to give extra scrutiny to advertisements directed at children because
it recognizes the undoubted influence children can have over their parents' purchasing decisions.
See, e.g., Avalon Indus. Inc., 83 F.T.C. 1728 (1974); Ideal Toy Corp., 64 F.T.C. 297 (1964).
118.
Heinz W. Kirchner Trading As Universe Co., 63 F.T.C. 1282 (1963).
119.
Bates v. Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 383-84 (1977).
120.
See Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 617 (3d Cir. 1976). See also Exposition
Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 869, 872 (2d Cir. 1961). But cf. Leonard F. Porter, Inc., 88 F.T.C. 546
(1976).
121.
See FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965) (finding that the
statutory scheme charging the FTC with regulating false advertising grants it influence in
applying the law and determining when advertisements are "deceptive"). See also Porter &
Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294, 300 (7th Cir. 1979); Simeon Mgmt. Corp. v. FTC, 579 F.2d
1137, 1145 (9th Cir. 1978); Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972) (noting that the FTC's accumulated
"expertise" in deciding false advertising cases justifies judicial deference).
122.
See Beneficial Corp., 542 F.2d at 617.
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3. Remedies for False Advertising
Although the First Amendment protects commercial speech, its
protection yields in cases of deceptive advertising. 123 As a result, the
FTC is also afforded wide discretion to prescribe remedies for false
advertising.124 Most often, the FTC orders the advertiser to cease
disseminating the advertisement. 1 25 Where an advertisement has
substantially permeated society, and thereby increased the likelihood
of injury, the FTC may order the seller to take proactive remedial
measures and issue corrective advertisements. 1 26 However, cease and
desist orders are not always the FTC's preferred course of action.
Other remedies include ordering the seller to provide consumers with
more or different information and more extensively training the
representatives of the seller. 27 The FTC may even take prophylactic
measures and prohibit the practices deemed deceptive for all
businesses in a given industry, even those that did not engage in the
deceptive advertising prior to the issuance of a remedial order. 128 In
analyzing the remedy employed by the FTC, the important factor for
courts to consider is whether the remedy is reasonably related to
curing the deception and is narrowly tailored to accomplish that
goal.129

III. THE MPAA RATINGS CONSTITUTE ILLEGAL FALSE ADVERTISING
The content ratings that the MPAA applies to films create
material representations about the content of those films that are
likely to influence consumers' purchasing decisions. Additionally, the
subjective nature of evaluating a film's objectionable content makes it
more likely that the ratings will mislead reasonable consumers. For
these reasons, the current process constitutes false advertising under
15 U.S.C. § 52 and, as a result, the FTC should order the MPAA to

123.
The Court has permitted this abrogation of First Amendment protection because
sellers are usually better able to evaluate the quality of their products and services than
consumers, and their commercial interest in communicating their findings to consumers obviates
the potential for undue restraint on speech. See Bates v. Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977).
124.
See Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 611-12 (1946).
125.
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2009); FTC v. Algoma Lumber, 291 U.S. 67 (1934).
126.
See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
127.
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
772 (1976); Litton Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 676 F.2d 364, 373 (9th Cir. 1982); Encyclopaedia
Britannica, Inc., 87 F.T.C. 421 (1976).
128.
See Jay Norris, Inc. v. FTC, 598 F.2d 1244, 1250 (2d Cir. 1979).
129.
Id. at 384; see also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771.
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augment its ratings
deception.

procedures

to

eliminate the

potential for

A. Applicability of the Law
The MPAA, which exists solely to advance the commercial
interests of its members in the motion picture and television
industries, 130 fits squarely within the mandate of Congress that the
FTC regulate corporations, including associations, that engage in
commerce and are organized to conduct business for the profit of their
members.13 1 Under that regulatory power, the FTC may police any
unfair or deceptive practices of the MPAA regarding false advertising
for five types of products, including "services." 132 While the statutes
define four of those five products, they do not define services. 33 Thus,
while no relevant statutory definition of "service" exists for the
purposes of false advertising, Black's Law Dictionary defines it
generally as "[t]he act of doing something useful for a person or
company for a fee."13 4 When contrasted with the relevant definition of
"goods" in Black's Law Dictionary, which requires an element of
tangibility,13 5 it becomes clear that the exhibition of films in theaters
to paying customers satisfies the definition of a service.136
While film production studios are the parties directly
responsible for representing the content of their films to the public
through advertisements that denote each film's MPAA rating, it is the
MPAA that is responsible for preparing those ratings. 13 7 Therefore,
even
though the MPAA makes
its potentially deceptive
representations to the public only indirectly, this distinction makes
little difference as, even if the FTC were to take action against
130.
See Motion Picture Association of America, About the MPAA, http://www.mpaa.org/
AboutUs.asp (last visited Aug. 19, 2009).
131.
15 U.S.C. §§ 44-45 (2009).
132.
15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 52(a)(2) (2009).
133.
See id. § 55.
134.
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1399 (8th ed. 2004).
135.
Id. at 714.
136.
While sales of copies of films for home viewing, such as DVDs or videocassettes,
would likely qualify as transactions involving "goods," this Note's focus is restricted to the
exhibition of films in theaters and similar establishments where the only tangible item that
customers purchase is their admission ticket (and, perhaps, their popcorn). However, none of the
tangible items that customers interact with at a theater allow them to experience the film at
their leisure; they purchase admission to a showing of a film, not an actual copy of the film itself.
137.
This can be likened either to providing documentation of the films' fitness for
particular audiences or to "packaging" the films to create an impression of their nature or
quality.
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production studios for using the misleading MPAA ratings in their
advertisements, the root cause of the problem is the MPAA itself.
Considering the FTC's wide discretion in ordering remedial actions,
any directive it imposes must ultimately reach the MPAA's rating
process itself in order to effectively preserve the social utility of
providing film content ratings to the public while eradicating the
deceptive elements of the current process. As a result, the MPAA,
either directly or indirectly, falls within the FTC's jurisdiction and its
film ratings constitute representations of the characteristics of a
service-namely, the content of exhibited films. Therefore, if the FTC
finds that the ratings constitute material representations of rated
films' attributes and have the propensity to mislead consumers as to
those attributes, then the MPAA has engaged in an illegal method of
unfair competition. 138
B. Materialityof the Representations
By examining admissions made by the MPAA, the FTC could
easily find that the representations made through the film ratings
fulfill the statutory materiality requirement. The MPAA boasts on its
web site that
Nationwide scientific polls ... have consistently given the rating program high marks
by parents throughout the land. The latest poll results show that 76% of parents with
children under 13 found the ratings to be "very useful" to "fairly useful" in helping them
make decisions for the moviegoing of their children. 139

With this statement, the MPAA explicitly admits that its ratings are
proven to directly and strongly influence parents' decisions regarding
which service they will either purchase themselves or allow their
children to purchase. It is important to note that the element of
materiality does not hinge on the seller making representations of
fact; statements of opinions are also sufficiently influential
40
representations. 1

138.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 52(a)(2)-(b).
139.
Motion Picture Association of America, Ratings Today, http://www.mpaa.org/
Ratings hstryRtTday.asp (last visited Aug. 19, 2009).
140.
See, e.g., Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1979) (finding
statements asserting the non-scientific extent of the efficacy of diet pills created a false
impression).
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C. Propensityfor Deception
As noted above, there is increased potential for deception in
advertising targeted at children.1 4 1 However, even if children are not
the sole intended audience for a particular advertisement, as long as
they constitute a part of the advertisement's larger consumer target,
the FTC will evaluate the potential for deception based upon the
advertisement's likelihood to mislead children. 42 When the MPAA
issues a rating for a film, it implies that the film is appropriate for a
particular audience because its content meets some minimum
standard of decency. 143 The qualitative subjectivity of any attempt at
standardizing the morality of First Amendment expressions forms the
crux of the rating system's deception because it imbues the ratings
with a misleading notion of precision and conveys a message to the
public that rated films meet a nonexistent objective standard.
Therefore, when a child views an advertisement for a film that
denotes the film's MPAA rating and wishes to see it and, after
inquiring as to the film's rating, the child's parent grants permission
based upon the rating, both the parent and the child have been
deceived into believing that the rating certifies the appropriateness of
the film according to an objective standard.
Because the MPAA has undertaken the responsibility of
representing films' content through its ratings, information which
would otherwise be unknown to consumers who have not actually
watched the films, the MPAA is obligated to use as precise an
evaluative method as possible and to communicate its findings
unambiguously so as to minimize the possibility of deception.1 44 Here,
where the ratings are powerful and ubiquitous, the MPAA's quiet
assertion that parents should consult additional sources of
information regarding films' content and refrain from using the
ratings as the sole basis for their choices of which films they allow
their children to see is utterly ineffective as a safeguard against
See supra notes 117-119.
141.
Heinz W. Kirchner Trading As Universe Co., 63 F.T.C. 1282 (1963).
142.
See Motion Picture Association of America, supra note 7.
143.
See Bates v. Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 383-84 (1977) ("[A]dvertising claims as to the
144.
quality of services . . . are not susceptible of measurement or verification; accordingly, such
claims may be so likely to be misleading as to warrant restriction."). Cf. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. v. FTC, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1973) (upholding the Commission's finding of deception in an
advertisement that marketed a "safe" automobile tire which implied that all such tires are
absolutely certain to be free of defects); Chrysler Corp., 99 F.T.C. 347 (1982) (finding assertions
to be misleading that certain engine parts would be substantially fit for use if they met certain
criteria).
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possible deception. 14 5 By assuming the role of an organization that
operates on behalf of families' interests, the mere act of issuing ratings
for films causes the MPAA to represent the quality and nature of
those films. 146 If a family attends a film that contains objectionable
content after relying on a MPAA rating that did not indicate as much,
then the MPAA has engaged in deception and injury has occurred.147
IV. SOLUTION: RECOMMENDED

FTC REMEDIAL ORDER

While this Note has been highly critical of the MPAA, it still
recognizes the social utility of rating systems in general and therefore
does not advocate for the total elimination of the MPAA system.
Instead, it proposes a twofold remedial modification of the system that
would eliminate the conflict of interest inherent in the current system
and adequately minimize the ratings' potential for deception without
running afoul of First Amendment protections. However, before
making these recommendations, it is helpful to consider other
countries' methods of rating and censoring films.
A. PossibleAlternatives: InternationalApproaches to Film Ratings
Foreign countries' solutions generally fall under three broad
categories: voluntary rating of films by an independent organization,
government-required rating of films by an independent organization
prior to exhibition, and government-sanctioned censorship. The first
approach, which most resembles the current system in the United
States, exists in countries such as Canada, Denmark, Germany,
Iceland, Japan, and the United Kingdom. 148 The Canadian and
145.
See
Motion
Picture
Association
of
America,
Parent
Information,
http://www.mpaa.org/RatingsParentInfo.asp (last visited Aug. 19, 2009) (urging parents to "learn
as much about a film as possible" before allowing their children to view it). Cf. Firestone, 481
F.2d at 248 (finding a "safe" tire advertisement misleading for failing to indicate the limitations
on safety).
146.
Cf. Peacock Buick, Inc., 86 F.T.C. 1532 (1975) (finding that selling used late-model
cars at prices near list prices creates a misleading impression in the minds of consumers that the
vehicles are new).
147.
See FTC v. Algoma Lumber, Co., 291 U.S. 67, 78 (1934) ("The consumer is prejudiced
if upon giving an order for one thing, he is supplied with something else.").
148.
See British Board of Film Classification, About the BBFC, http://www.bbfc.co.uk/
about/index.php (last visited Aug. 19, 2009); Canadian Motion Picture Distributors Association,
Theatrical
Release
Classification,
http://www.cmpda.ca/?q=content/theatrical-releaseclassification (last visited Aug. 19, 2009); Film Classification and Rating Committee,
Introduction to EIRIN, http://www.eirin.jp/english/index.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2009);
MedierAdets,
About
the
Media
Council
for
Children
and
Young
People,
http://eng.medieraadet.dldAbout%20Us/About%20us.aspx (last visited Aug. 19, 2009); Samtdk
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British approaches vary from the American system in several
respects. In Canada, seven provincial review boards assign a rating to
a given film for its theatrical release within each respective province's
boundaries; 149 then, in preparation for home video distribution, an
independent organization aggregates the provincial ratings, with the
exception of Quebec's, to issue an additional nationwide rating. 150 At
the provincial level, the government itself may be involved in
assigning ratings, as is the case in Saskatchewan and Quebec.1 5 1 In
the United Kingdom, an independent organization issues the ratings,
52
but municipalities retain the legislative power to supersede them.
It may behoove the FTC to investigate the effect and manageability of
similar rating systems in America that could vary between states to
the extent it finds that the benefits of such an approach would
outweigh the costs of administering it.
Even more valuable to the FTC in its evaluation of prescriptive
remedies to the MPAA ratings is the evolution of the rating process in
Japan. After World War II, the Japanese motion picture industry
created a self-regulating organization modeled off of the MPAA named
the Film Classification and Rating Committee (EIRIN), which had the
responsibility to rate the content of films exhibited in Japan.153 In the
1950s, EIRIN was criticized for several reasons, one of which was that
the individuals in charge of administering the organization's bylaws
and examining films also belonged to the very industry that financed
it, thereby creating the potential for manipulation of the ratings to
satisfy commercial, rather than public, interests. 154 In order to
remove this conflict of interest, EIRIN reorganized itself and recruited
professors, lawyers, and teachers from outside the motion picture
industry to join the organization's members in certifying films for
Mynddretthafa i islandi, http://www.smais.is/template25024.asp?pageid=4658 (last visited Aug.
19, 2009); Spitzenorganisation der Filmwirtschaft e.V., http://www.spio.de/mediacontent/
607.pdf (last visited Aug. 19, 2009).
149.
Canadian Motion Picture Distributors Association, Film Classification Boards,
http://www.cmpda.ca/?q=content/film-classification-boards (last visited Aug. 19, 2009).
150.
Canadian Motion Picture Distributors Association, Home Entertainment
Classification, http://www.cmpda.ca/?q=contenthome-entertainment-classification (last visited
Aug. 19, 2009).
151.
Canadian Motion Picture Distributors Association, Film Classification Boards, supra
note 149; R~gie du Cindma Qudbec, http://www.rcq.qc.camult/home.asp?lng=en (last visited Aug.
19, 2009).
152.
British Board of Film Classification, About the BBFC, http://www.bbfc.co.uk/
about/index.php (last visited Aug. 19, 2009).
153.
Film
Classification
and
Rating
Committee,
Introduction
to
EIRIN,
http://www.eirin.jp/english/index.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2009).
154.

Id.
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exhibition. 155 While the Japanese government's requirement that a
film have an EIRIN certificate before being shown at EIRIN
theaters 156 is a "prior restraint" on speech that is likely illegal under
United States' law, 157 the organization's solution to its conflict of
interest would provide useful direction to the FTC in remedying the
similar problem with the MPAA.
The second approach, used in France, the Netherlands,
Norway, and Singapore, involves the government-imposed
requirement that a film meet certain criteria, either statutorily or
independently created, prior to public exhibition. 58 This arrangement
resembles the restrictive state of cinema in the United States prior to
the Supreme Court's decision to grant First Amendment protection to
motion pictures, 15 9 but the content regulations are often codified in the
law of these countries. 160 The French government requires that
production companies receive an operating license prior to making a
film and a distribution certificate prior to contracting with a theater to
show a film.1 6 '

In the Netherlands, the film rating process has

progressed further from government influence since 1997 when the
confluence of growing political pressures and an influx of a critical
mass of audiovisual media into the country prompted the Dutch
government to explore the option of creating an independent
regulatory body responsible for rating the content of all audiovisual
media, including films. 1 62 The government's efforts culminated in
1999 with the creation of the Netherlands Institute for the
155.
Id.
156.
Id.
157.
See supra note 29.
158.
See Centr6 National du Cinema et de l'Image Anim6e, Regulatory Function,
http://www.cnc.fr/Site/Template/T9B.aspx?SELECTID=2063&id=1326&t=2 (last visited Aug. 19,
2009); Centr6 National du Cinema et de l'Image Anim~e, Film Classification, http://www.cnc.fr/
SitelTemplatelT9B.aspx?SELECTID=2102&id=1364&t=2 (last visited Nov. 3, 2009); Media
Development Authority, Film Policies and Guidelines, http://www.mda.gov.sg/wms.www/
devnpolicies.aspx?sid=93 (lastvisited Aug. 19, 2009); Netherlands Institute for the Classification
of Audio-Visual Media, http://www.kijkwijzer.nllpagina.php?id=3 (last visited Aug. 19, 2009);
Norwegian Media
Authority, Organization of the
Norwegian Media Authority,
http://www.medietilsynet.no/en-gb/The-Norwegian-Media-Authority/English-Menu/The-Media/
(lastvisited Aug. 19, 2009).
159.
See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
160.
See supra note 158.
161.
Centr6 National de la Cin6matographie, Regulatory Function - Operating License,
http://www.cnc.fr/Site/Template/T9B.aspx?SELECTID=2071&id=1334&t=3 (last visited Aug. 19,
2009); Centr6 National de la Cin6matographie, Film Classification, http://www.cnc.fr/Site/
TemplateT9B.aspx?SELECTID=2102&id=1364&t=2 (last visited Nov. 3, 2009).
162.
Netherlands
Institute
for
the
Classification
of Audio-Visual
Media,
http://www.kijkwijzer.nllpagina.php?id=3 (last visited Aug. 19, 2009).
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Classification of Audiovisual Media (NICAM), a self-regulating
organization that, while independent in form, is still closely monitored
by the Dutch government's Media Authority to ensure that the motion
picture industry complies with the law. 16 3 In Norway, films intended
for commercial exhibition to minors must be approved and classified
by the Norwegian Media Authority, an independent organization
designed to apply and uphold government regulations. 164 The process
in place in Singapore mirrors that of Norway. 16
The third approach is government-sanctioned censorshipeither explicitly termed as such or implied by the process-and is used
in Ireland, New Zealand, Sweden, Australia, and Finland. 66 Even
though the Irish Film Classification Office (IFCO) is responsible for
classifying all films prior to their distribution within Ireland, the
IFCO was headed by the Official Film Censor (an undeniably obvious
sign of censorship) until the IFCO renamed the position as the
"Director of Film Classification.1 67 In New Zealand, the Office of Film

163.
Id.
164.
Norwegian
Media
Authority,
Introduction
to
Media
in
Norway,
http://www.medietilsynet.no/en-gb/The-Norwegian-Media-Authority/English-Menu/The-Media/
(last
visited
Aug.
19,
2009);
Norwegian
Media
Authority,
Organisation
http://www.medietilsynet.no/en-gb/The-Norwegian-Media-Authority/English-MenuTheOrganisation/ (last visited Aug. 19, 2009).
165.
Compare Norwegian Media Authority, Introduction to Media in Norway,
http://www.medietilsynet.no/en-gb/The-Norwegian-Media-Authority/English-Menu/TheMedia/
(last visited Aug. 19, 2009), with Films Act, 1981, Act 22, Ch. 107 §§ 3, 6, 14-16, (1981) (amended
1997, 1998, 2002, and 2009) (Sing.), available at http://agcvldb4.agc.gov.sg/non-version/cgibincgi-.retrieve.pl?actno=REVED- 107&doctitle=FILMS%20ACTOa&date=latest&method=part,
and Media Development Authority, Film Policies and Guidelines, http://www.mda.gov.sg/
wms.www/devnpolicies.aspx?sid=93 (last visited Aug. 19, 2009).
166.
See
Commonwealth
of
Australia,
Classification
in
Australia,
http://www.classification.gov.aulwww/cob/classification.nsf/Page/ClassificationinAustralia-whow
eareWhoweare (last visited Aug. 19, 2009); Commonwealth of Australia, Classification Board,
http://www.classification.gov.au/www/cob/classification.nsf/Page/ClassificationinAustralia-Whow
eareClassificationBoard.ClassificationBoard (last visited Aug. 19, 2009); Finnish Board of Film
Classification, Overview of the Finnish Board of Film Classification, http://www.vet.filenglish/
yleista.php (last visited Aug. 19, 2009); Irish Film Classification Office, What the IFCO Does,
http://www.ifco.ie/website/ifco/ifcoweb.nsf/web/mission?opendocument&type=graphic (last visited
Aug. 19, 2009); Office of Film & Literature Classification, Censorship Law in New Zealand,
http://www.censorship.govt.nz/thelaw.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2009); Statens Biografbyr&,
Legal Texts, http://www.statensbiografbyra.se/legal.htm (last visited Aug. 19, 2009).
167.
Irish Film Classification Office, Director of Film Classification, http://www.ifco.ie/
website/ifco/ifcoweb.nsf/web/filmcensor?OpenDocument&type=graphic
(last visited Aug. 19,
2009); Irish Film Classification Office, What the IFCO Does, http://www.ifco.ie/website/ifco/
ifcoweb.nsf/web/mission?opendocument&type=graphic (last visited Aug. 19, 2009). Ireland's
complacency with censorship largely stems from the strong historical influence of the Catholic
Church within the country. See KEVIN ROCKErT, IRISH FILM CENSORSHIP: A CULTURAL JOURNEY
FROM SILENT CINEMA TO INTERNET PORNOGRAPHY (2005), available at http://www.ifco.ie/ifco/
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& Literature Classification has the statutory responsibility for
censoring and regulating films that are "likely to be harmful, or
injurious to the public good" 168 because they depict "matters such as
sex, horror, crime, cruelty, or violence in such a manner that ... is
likely to be injurious to the public good." 16 9 Swedish law requires a
film to be examined by the National Film Board of Censors prior to
70
public exhibition with some limited exceptions not relevant here.
In contrast to Ireland, New Zealand, and Sweden, which seem
more comfortable with referring to their rating schemes as outright
censorship, Australia and Finland prefer to use the term
"classification" to define their governmental regulation of films;
nevertheless, the actual processes are essentially the same.
Australian law requires films to be "classified" by the government
Classification Board prior to being made available to the public. 171 A
similar requirement exists in Finland, but the Finnish Board of Film
Classification, organized under the Ministry of Education, only needs
to classify films that are intended for exhibition to minors, while all
other films simply need to be registered. 72 Regardless of the semantic
implications involved in terming these processes as "classification"
rather than "censorship," the high degree of government involvement
in the process of regulating the distribution and exhibition of films
makes it repulsive to American sensibilities of freedom of
expression. 73 As a result, the United States would likely disfavor the
use of government-required ratings promulgated by an independent
organization, as well as government-imposed censorship in regulating

ifcoweb.nsfllookupreports2/AA073005F7A0F95780256F020055DD28/$File/a+history.pdf?openele
ment (synopsis of book). However, standards have liberalized considerably in the last fifty years.
Id.
168.
Office of Film & Literature Classification, Censorship Law in New Zealand,
http://www.censorship.govt.nz/thelaw.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2009).
169.
Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act of 1993, 1993 S.N.Z. No. 94, Part 1
§ 3, available at http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1993/0094/latest/DLM3 13407.html.
170.
Statens Biografbyr, Legal Texts, http://www.statensbiografbyra.se/legal.htm (last
visited Aug. 19, 2009).
171.
Commonwealth
of
Australia,
What
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Classification
Board
Does,
http://www.classification.gov.au/www/cob/classification.nsflPage/Classification-inAustraliaWha
t we do (lastvisited Aug. 19, 2009).
172.
Finnish Board of Film Classification, http://www.vet.fi/english/yleista.php (last
visited Feb. 2, 2009).
173.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the
State of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 689 (1959); Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960, 961 (1952); Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 505 (1952).
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the content of films, due to American courts' general resistance to
174
government involvement in the regulation of speech.
B. Enhanced Qualificationsand Appointment Proceduresfor the
CARA Members
The fact that the MPAA does not require those who actually
rate films to have any special knowledge in the areas of child
psychology or children's mental development 175 raises doubts as to
their qualifications to evaluate the content of the vast majority of
films as acceptable or not for particular age groups. Taking guidance
from Japan, part of the FTC's remedy for the MPAA's false advertising
should, at the very least, require the CARA to consult with certified
child psychologists regarding films' content before issuing a rating.
Ideally, several positions should be reserved solely for individuals with
qualifications in the fields of child or even general psychology.
While the MPAA emphasizes that the CARA remains fully
independent and immune from industry influence, 176 the fact that the
MPAA Chairperson appoints the CARA's chairperson calls this claim
into question.1 77 Since the MPAA ratings have substantial power to
influence the commercial success of films,1 78 the FTC should also order
the MPAA to augment the procedures for appointing the CARA
members so as to avoid empowering a select few within the MPAA to
choose those who rate films produced by MPAA members. A more
democratic process in choosing the raters that takes into account the
174.
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
175.
See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
176.
Id.
177.
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
178.
As of August 19, 2009, 92 of the 100 highest grossing films of all time in the United
States were released after the introduction of the PG-13 rating in 1984. Box Office Mojo, All
Time Box Office: Domestic Grosses, http://www.boxofficemojo.com/alltime/domestic.htm (last
visited Aug. 19, 2009). More than half of those films, fifty-one in all, actually received a PG-13
rating, the rating that appeals to the widest audience range because theaters may allow children
of any age to view a film rated PG-13 without a parent or guardian and also because the content
of films rated PG-13 is more likely to appeal to adults than films rated G or PG, as the films with
the latter two ratings tend to contain more juvenile subject matter. Id.; see also Motion Picture
Association of America, Ratings Revisions, http://www.mpaa.org/Ratings hstryRvsns.asp (last
visited Aug. 19, 2009) (noting that the PG-13 rating was created in 1984). See generally Internet
Movie Database, http://www.imdb.com (last visited Aug. 19, 2009) (containing MPAA ratings for
all of the films that the MPAA has rated). Moreover, sorting the twenty highest grossing films of
each year between 1985 and 2008 by their ratings reveals that films rated PG-13 constituted
either the largest or second largest proportion of those films in all but two years. National
Association of Theatre Owners, Top Movies by Rating, http://www.natoonline.org/
statisticsratings.htm (last visited Aug. 19, 2009).
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concerns of both filmmakers that are members of the MPAA and those
that are not would produce a much more commercially fair ratings
system. The FTC should therefore investigate this question further
and consider requiring the CARA to separate completely from the
MPAA.
The proposals to improve the qualifications of the CARA
members and revise the process of appointing them would ensure that
a more intelligible basis is given for a film's rating than the sum of lay
parents' capricious conjectures as to what the majority of American
parents would find appropriate for their children. At the same time,
these proposals would also safeguard against the potential for a
conflict of interest between the goals of the individuals rating the
179
films and commercial pressure from filmmakers.
C. Comprehensive Content Evaluations
In addition to requiring the CARA to take the evolving body of
knowledge surrounding adolescent psychological development into
account when issuing ratings, the FTC should also require it to
prepare a detailed list of the instances of potentially objectionable
content within a film, along with the context in which the content
appears, and to make this list available to parents so that they may
use it as part of their decision-making process when purchasing
theater tickets for their children. 18 0 This could be achieved by making
such lists available on the Internet and distributing them to all
theaters that screen MPAA-rated films. Those theaters could then
provide their customers with copies of the lists upon request.
This requirement would obviously entail more effort from the
MPAA and may consequently cause it to increase the fee that it
charges to rate films, which could have the indirect effect of increasing
theater ticket prices. Consequently, independent studios, which often
have fewer capital resources than large major studios to produce their
films, may find it more difficult to produce smaller-scale films.
179.
See supra notes 62, 77-78 and accompanying text.
180.
Care should be taken to avoid ruining the movie-going experience. While the FTC
should require posters, printed advertisements, and trailers or previews that advertise a film
and indicate its rating to also inform the public of this new approach to rating films, including
the availability of the lists of objectionable content, it should not order the MPAA to include the
actual lists of objectionable content within the advertisements themselves. Since the lists should
be required to contain explicit, but objective, detail in their description of the instances of
objectionable material, there would be a strong potential for providing information regarding a
film's plot that would spoil the movie for those who would prefer not to learn such information
before seeing the movie.
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Notwithstanding these considerations, the potential for injury to the
public as a result of the current rating system's deceptive tendencies
justifies the issuance of a remedial order that has the abstract
potential to increase the fees that filmmakers must pay to the MPAA
in order to have their films rated. In addition, the severity of this
public injury, along with the fact that many consider the MPAA the de
facto film content evaluation source, justifies the FTC's mandate that
the MPAA provide such content evaluations to the public even though
181
other organizations already make them available.
The greatest advantage of this remedy is that it enhances the
social utility provided by film ratings while remaining entirely in
alignment with the First Amendment. 8 2 The government would have
no involvement with the actual adjudication of films' appropriateness
for different audience demographics, 8 3 and, more importantly, the
process would not constitute a prior restraint on speech because films
would not be legally required to receive an MPAA rating prior to
exhibition or distribution. 8 4 The result would be a rating scheme that
better informs parents about the content of films in order for them to
make adequately educated decisions about their children's filmviewing habits, as well as their own, while assuaging the fear of undue
suppression of the expression of ideas in the United States.
V. CONCLUSION

Motion pictures have come a long way from their origin as a
novelty exhibition. 8 5 The more recent notion that films actually
possess the ability to contribute to society's progress by
communicating ideas and opinions has garnered them the privilege of
protection from undue government influence that is provided by the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution.1 8 6 That is not to
say, however, that all films are appropriate for exhibition in all places
at all times for all people. Indeed, while some films contain material
that may have a strong influence in advancing ideas that are
important to society, those same films may also have a negative

181.
See, e.g., Critics, Inc., Kids-in-Mind, http://www.kids-in-mind.com (last visited Aug.
19, 2009); Screen It, Inc., Entertainment Reviews for Parents, http://screenit.com (last visited
Aug. 19, 2009).
182.
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
183.
See discussion supraPart IV.B-C.
184.
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
185.
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
186.
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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psychological impact upon minds that are not mature enough to fully

comprehend and appropriately interpret the portrayed subject matter.
This ability of films-and, indeed, all forms of communication-to
convey a message that, as a result of misinterpretation by the
message's recipient, differs from what the speaker intended to express
has formed the problematic basis that underlies much of the debate
surrounding the extent of First Amendment freedoms. Where the law
falls short of discovering a universal solution to the issue of balancing
expressions' social value with their potential social harm, the private
sector often steps in and attempts to provide its own remedy. In the
film industry, the MPAA serves as the private actor that has most
prominently undertaken this challenge.
The nobility of the MPAA's stated goal of educating parents
about films' content prior to allowing their children to watch them
should not be understated. The rating scheme derived by the MPAA
marks undeniable progress towards a comprehensive approach to
safeguarding the best interests of children while maximizing
individual liberty. However, the current system has numerous faults.
There exists an immutable conflict of interest when the MPAA, in its
role as an industry association, is responsible for advancing the
interests of the film industry while, in its role as a sort of oversight
committee, issues recommendations about the age-appropriateness of
films created by its members18 7 that have great potential to impact the
financial performance of those films.18 8 Moreover, the qualificationsor lack thereof-required for an individual to serve on the CARA

Ratings Board that actually rates the films submitted to the MPAA
have, at best, a questionable relation to the ability to make intelligent
decisions regarding the appropriateness of a film's content for a given
age demographic.18 9 Ultimately, the MPAA has been only slightly
more successful than the legal system in solving the problem of
attempting to use objective bases to evaluate communications which
are largely subjective in their nature.
Due to the MPAA's shortcomings, the ratings that it assigns to
films have the potential to mislead consumers about a given film's
true content. 190 It is of no matter whether the ratings actually have,
in fact, misled anyone. 19' Rather, the issue is whether the inclusion of

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
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See
See
See
See

supra notes 73, 77-78 and accompanying text.
supra note 178.
supra note 72 and accompanying text.
supra notes 132-138 and accompanying text.
supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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a letter or alphanumeric symbol that broadly indicates a film's content
in its advertisements is likely to mislead consumers because the
symbol takes no account of the context in which that content is
portrayed. 192 Since this falls under the definition of an unlawful "false
advertisement"-an advertisement that has the potential to mislead
consumers in a material respect with regards to the service being
advertised 193-the FTC should exercise its power over the MPAA and
deem the current film ratings as false advertising. However, due to
the social utility of content ratings, the FTC should use its wide
discretion in prescribing remedies and order the MPAA to send its
rating system back to the editing room for further refinement in order
to maximize commercial fairness and consumer access to information,
rather than fading to black on the system altogether.
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